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In  the  continuing  drama  of "Who  Will  Control  Agriculture,"
consumers  or  their  self-appointed  spokesmen  such  as  George
Meany, Ralph Nader,  Paul Ehrlich, Barry Commoner, Henry  Kis-
singer,  Jim  Hightower,  or  a  TV  documentary  have  won  several
skirmishes,  if not the war.  That this group  so  completely  alien  to
farmers'  thinking  and  tradition  would  determine  farm  policy  is  a
turn of events unthinkable  a few years ago. The agricultural  estab-
lishment  has  temporarily  lost  more  than  control  of  its  policy
agenda;  it has  lost  control  of farm  policy itself.
CONSUMERS  IN  A  NATIONAL FOOD POLICY
The  terms,  "national  food policy"  or "food  and farm policy,"
are now  widely  used  as euphemisms  for farm  policy tilted  toward
consumers'  interests.  In the not too distant  past, consumers'  prin-
cipal  concerns  were  product  safety  and  nutrition  along  with ade-
quate  supplies  of food  in  general  and for low-income  persons  in
particular.  Consumer  interests  have  found  expression  in  laws  re-
quiring fortification  of food  nutrients,  labeling of nutrient content
and  volume,  sanitary  inspection,  unadulterated  foods,  and  food
stamps for the poor.  In general,  these laws were  in the interests  of
farmers  as  well  as consumers.
What  sets recent  events  apart  from previous activity  is  unilat-
eral consumer action which is neither in the interest of farmers nor
in  the long-term interest of consumers.  Actions  include  price  ceil-
ings  on  farm  commodities,  export controls,  and  rejection  of even
minimally  adequate  price  supports for farm commodities.
Many  diverse  "consumer"  advocates  from  George  Meany  to
Jim  Hightower  engage  in  all  manner of hyperbole  and emotional
appeals  to base instincts, much to the consternation  of more sober
analysts.  While  some  consumer  interests  voice  reasoned  and  en-
tirely justifiable concerns  worthy of immediate  alleviation  by  pub-
lic policy or other means, other "consumer"  advocates  seem woe-
fully uninformed.  Consumers justifiably  want an ample  quantity of
high  quality food  at low  and  stable  prices,  but unscrupulous  pro-
moters  give  the  impression  that  this  food  should  be  organically
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Labor Unions
Labor unions have been the most articulate  spokesmen for con-
sumer causes in recent months. For wage workers,  organized labor
steadfastly  has  pursued earnings  stability,  including  cost-of-living
wage escalators,  to maintain  purchasing power during  inflationary
periods.  Unemployment  is  aggravated  by wage  rates notoriously
inflexible  downward,  in  part  because  of  institutional  rigidities
created to avoid just such an adjustment. Farm income remains the
only major "labor"  return  fluctuating  widely  from  year to year.
The  unkindest  cut  of  all  was  refusal  of  the  International
Longshoremen's  Association  to  load wheat  for the Soviet  Union
on the pretext that it was inflationary.  The longshoremen  asked to
be  shown  that  the  grain  sales  would  not  raise  living  costs  before
they would  go back to work. Although the real reason for the strike
appeared  to  be  failure  to  haul  enough  of the  wheat  in  American
ships,  the  lesson  for  farm  interests  is  that  the  union  saw  fit  to
appeal  to  consumers  as  allies  through  the  food  price  issue.  Or-
ganized  labor,  torn between  their  philosophical  identification  with
efforts  to  stabilize  farm  earnings  and  their  own  self interests  of
holding down  food prices,  opted for the  latter in the  crunch.
Again  the  issue  of uninformed  consumer  advocates  emerges.
Free  trade  lowers  the  real  cost of living  and  raises  real  income.
Wage  gains  in  the  marketing  sector  will  add at  least 3 percent  to
food costs  in  1975-more  than  double the  1.3  percent  increase  in
consumers'  food costs  resulting  from the sale of 10  million tons of
grains  to the  Soviet  Union.
Food  Policy  by  the Uninformed
An outgrowth of the philosophy that "agriculture  is too impor-
tant to be left to agriculturalists"  is the emergence of a new  set of
gloomy  agricultural  "experts."  Paul  Ehrlich  asserts,  "The  battle
to feed all of humanity  is over.  In the  1970's  the world will undergo
famines-hundreds  of millions  of people  are  going  to  starve  to
death  in spite of any crash programs  embarked  upon  now.  At this
late date  nothing  can  prevent  a substantial  increase  in the  world
death  rate."  Carl  Schramm  of  the  Johns  Hopkins  School  of
Hygiene  and  Public  Health  contends  that the  weather  cycle  will
drastically  lower  U.S.  harvests  through  the  remainder  of  the
1970's,  that  a  grain  shortage  will  be  with  us  for  the  foreseeable
future, and to increase grain output "the federal government might
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priate shipping centers.  For example,  Oklahoma  and Texas  might
be devoted  entirely to wheat production."  He curiously goes on to
conclude that  "a  strategy of lower world  food  prices  is necessary
both  to  help food  importers  satisfy their demands  and  to  prompt
other exporting nations  to  produce  more  grain  more  efficiently."
In 1972,  huge pressures to eliminate commodity surpluses were
placed  on agricultural  officials  by Nixon's  top advisors,  who  had
no  background  in  agriculture.  The result was  a seriously misman-
aged  sale, excessive acreage  diversion in 1972 and  1973, and virtual
elimination  of commodity stocks.  The consumer thus far has been
the  principal  victim of the price  instability  associated  with  inade-
quate  stocks.
Food  Policy  by Veto
Consumers'  influence  was  not apparent  in March  1975,  when
Congress  passed emergency  farm  legislation  to raise  substantially
the loan and "established"  or "target"  prices for traditionally sup-
ported  farm  commodities.  Neither  was  the  consumers'  interest
necessarily  evident when  President Ford,  upon the advice of Sec-
retary Butz,  vetoed the legislation  because it was viewed by many
as  potentially  too  expensive  to taxpayers  and  too  encouraging  of
overproduction.  But consumer influence  was  evident when  Presi-
dent  Ford  rejected  an  increase  in commodity  loan  rates to  more
modest  levels  than favored  by  Congress,  despite  alleged  encour-
agement by Secretary  Butz to  raise  loan rates.
Consumers'  interests  were  decisive  in  the  postponement  of
further  grain  sales  to  the Soviet  Union.  After failure  of the  Ford
Administration to raise loan rates and after Secretary  Butz's earlier
commitment to "make every effort"  to avoid export restrictions,  it
seemed incongruent to farmers that they be denied access to higher
prices  after  being  denied  protection  against  low  prices  for  their
products.  If  the  Administration  was  to  leave  low  prices  open
ended,  it seemed  only fair to also leave high  prices  open ended.
Despite  these  many  evidences  of consumer  influence  in  farm
policy,  it is  ironic that consumer interests  have  not really  partici-
pated  in  the  farm  policy  dialogue  nor  decision  process-their
influence  has  been  largely  through  the  "veto."  Evidence  for the
veto theory is  apparent:  Since  Secretary  Butz was known to  have
favored both an increase in the loan rate  and the strong statement
asserting  there  would  be  no  export  restraints,  the  assumption  is
that the  USDA has been  overruled  on both  points.
105Consumer  veto  power undoubtedly  creates  anxious  moments
for a Secretary  of Agriculture  who  has been an effective  and  pre-
sumably sincere  spokesman for farm interests.  Because of political
pressures,  the  Secretary  of Agriculture  goes along  with consumer
policies  with  which  he  disagrees.  The  result  is  an  image  in  the
minds of many farmers of a USDA bent on a "cheap food"  policy,
serving  consumers'  interests  at farmers'  expense.
DEVISING  A NATIONAL  FOOD AND FARM  POLICY
Agricultural  policies  will  be quite different  if the  future  supply-
demand  balance  is characterized  by chronic excess demand  or by
chronic  excess  supply.
Long-Term  Supply-Demand  Balance
There  is  now  strong  evidence  that  demand  will  increase  at  a
more  rapid  rate  than  supply  of farm  food  and  fiber  in  the  next
decade  or  longer.  Productivity  gains  have  slowed  substantially
since the  1950's,  and the ratio of farm output to production  inputs
is  expected to increase  little faster than  1 percent  per  year on  the
average  to  1985.  If inflation in prices paid by farmers averages only
6  percent  annually  (compared to  16  percent  in  1973  and  again  in
1974),  and  if the supply elasticity is 0.2,  then the supply curve  will
shift backward by 6(0.2)  - 1.2 percent annually, completely offset-
ting the forward  shift  from productivity  gains.
Expected rates  of gain  in demand  have  been  studied at length.
For the next decade,  realistic estimates place  domestic population
growth  at 0.7 percent  annually,  growth  in per capita personal  dis-
posable  income  at  2.5  percent,  growth  in  exports  at  4  percent,
income elasticity  at  0.1,  and  exports  at  18 percent of output, for a
total  annual  increase  in  demand  of  0.82  [0.7  + 0.1(2.5)]  +  0.18
[4]  =  1.5  percent.
With  the  supply curve  nearly stationary  and the demand  curve
increasing  1.5  percent  per year,  farmers  would appear to  be in for
good  times and  consumers for hard  times. This  is not  so.  Simula-
tion  models  of the  farming  industry  show  that  inflation  in  prices
paid  by  farmers is  neither fully  nor immediately  passed to proces-
sors or consumers.  Hence,  rising  prices  received  by farmers  are
offset  by rising  prices  paid associated  with  general  inflation  in the
economy.  Thus,  the  ratio  of  prices  received  to  prices  paid  by
farmers  shows  no strong trend on the  average  to  1985.
Simulation  analysis  indicates  that  with  4  percent  or  less
inflation  in  prices  paid,  farmers  can maintain  net  farm  income  at
reasonable  levels  (approximately  the  1974  nominal  level)  without
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government  programs  of magnitudes  similar  to  those  operating
from  1960 to  1972 will  be required to  avoid very low farm income.
With  8 percent or greater  inflation,  massive  intervention  in farm
markets appears  necessary to avoid a farm financial  debacle  in the
next decade.  Under any of the  above  conditions,  consumers  will
spend a declining share of incomes for farm food ingredients  if real
per capita incomes  are  rising.
Within  expected  ranges  of demand  and  supply,  farmers  are
likely to experience  intermittent  periods of excess  supply  and low
income  as  well as excess  demand  and high income.  A policy  "for
all seasons"  is required to cope with unpredictable  emerging condi-
tions.  Central  to that  policy  is  commodity  stock reserves.
Economic  Instability  and Commodity  Reserves
Economic  instability  and  measures  to  deal  with  it  currently
comprise the  most pressing policy issues.  Several means are avail-
able  to  reduce  instability,  including  export  and  import  controls,
commodity  stock manipulation,  and  price or income  supports.
EXPORT CONTROLS.  Demands for export controls to serve U.S.
consumer  interests  have  been deterred  by threats  by importers  of
American  farm  products  to  go  elsewhere  for supplies,  the  impor-
tance  of maintaining access  to  world  markets  to  earn reserves  to
purchase  petroleum  and  other  products,  fear of reciprocal  trade
barriers,  and other reasons.  However,  the  Soviet  Union has been
in large  part responsible for variation  in U.S. exports,  and we feel
much  less  obligated  to  assure  supplies  to  them  than  to  regular
customers  in Japan and Western  Europe.
But are  export  controls  on  the  Soviets  effective?  As  long  as
alternative  sources of supply exist, the Soviet  Union can purchase
grains  in  Western  Europe,  Canada,  Australia,  Argentina,  and
elsewhere.  Customers  which  would  have  purchased  from  these
countries  but  which  do  not  face  U.S.  embargoes  can  switch  pur-
chases to us.  Export controls not only may not be effective  but are
highly unpalatable  to farmers.  Export controls  cannot be viewed as
a permanent instrument to stabilize markets by a nation committed
to open trade channels and dependent on access to world markets.
PRICE  SUPPORTS.  In July  1975,  target prices  were 45 percent  of
parity  for  wheat  and  corn,  while  loan  rates  were  30  percent  of
parity for wheat and  36 percent of parity for corn.  A considerable
amount of production  is not covered by target prices.  Farm income
would be cut in  half compared  to  1973  if prices  should  fall  to loan
107levels  and  would  be  inadequate  to  avoid  a  major  financial
disaster-eliminating  many  young,  efficient  farmers  who  have
much to contribute.  Reasonable men view  supports at  100 percent
of 1910-14  parity as unrealistic  because of increased productivity;
reasonable  men also  view as  unrealistic  loan rates  of less than  30
percent of parity.  Projections  indicate that continuation of the cur-
rent  commodity  program  to  the late  1970's  would  result  in  a net
income of $17 billion,  approximately  half the  1973  level  and much
less than half in buying power.  Supports are  so low that deficiency
payments  are  likely  to be nominal  to  1980.
Many feel that loan and target prices should be raised, but some
proposals  entail  very  large  deficiency  payments.  Loan  and  target
prices established by House  Bill H.R. 4296, the conference version
finally passed  by  the Ninety-fourth  Congress  but vetoed by  Presi-
dent Ford,  would require deficiency  payments of $7 billion by  1977
with  no escalator  for higher prices paid  and of $11  billion  by  1979
with an escalator  based on prices  paid  by farmers.
Adjusting  support  prices  according  to  past yields  is  an  inade-
quate  procedure  because  yields  overestimate  productivity  gains,
thereby overdeflating supports, and are inappropriately sensitive to
weather.  Despite  continued  inflation  in  prices  paid,  target  prices
are  projected to fall in the late  1970's because of sharp recovery of
yields  after unfavorable  weather in the  mid-1970's.
For some time,  proposals have been made to support  prices  at
"world levels,"  defined as a moving average of past market prices.
Cost-of-production  support prices are  now receiving greater atten-
tion.  Recently proposed legislation would support  prices at 80 per-
cent of the cost of production,  including  a land  charge  calculated
from crop-share  rent.  A more attractive approach to avoid validat-
ing escalating land prices caused by speculation  is to support prices
on the basis of nonland operating costs  of production,  with appro-
priate adjustment for spatial demands so that production  would not
move out of areas with a comparative advantage  to high-cost areas.
Recent  policy  proposals  call  for an end to  direct  payments  in-
herent  in target or established  prices.  Reasons  to  eliminate  direct
payments  include the  tendency  for them to  provide  overly  gener-
ous transfers to large farms,  failure to  hold reserve capacity useful
to stabilize  farm  commodity  and  food  prices,  and  opposition  by
taxpayers  to. high  outlays  for  compensatory  payments.  Further-
more,  direct  payments  are  tied to past allotments,  which  now  are
an obsolete and  inequitable  allocative  basis.
But  arguments  can  also  be  made  in favor of direct  payments.
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designed  to compensate  farmers for risks  incurred  in  providing an
adequate  food  supply.  Farmers  can  receive  the  "insurance  pre-
miums"  while  consumers  receive  low-cost food  in  periods  of ex-
cess  supply.  Milton  Ericksen  and  Daryll  Ray  state  that  "land
withdrawal  may  not  be  an  acceptable  remedy  [for  low  farm
income] since other parts of the world may still face  shortages. The
U.S.  could face  strong adverse  world  opinion  if production  were
curtailed  to support  prices  and farm  income."  Furthermore,  pro-
duction  controls  on land  are  increasingly  ineffective  and  result  in
high food costs when  they are effective.  In a consumer dominated
policy,  production  controls  are  unlikely  to be  acceptable  unless
they can be  shown to be an essential part of a program  to stabilize
food  prices.
COMMODITY  STOCKS.  Research suggests that carryovers of 600
million  bushels  of wheat,  45  million  tons  of feed  grains,  and  150
million  bushels  of  soybeans  are  optimal  on  the  average.  Stocks
much  below  these  levels  result  in  considerable  price  instability.
Analysis  shows that  the  suggested  optimal carryover  stock  levels
are  associated  with  commodity  prices  much  below  current
levels-with  prices  unpalatable  to  farmers.  The private  trade  will
not hold optimal  stocks because  investors  can  be suddenly  wiped
out by capricious  government policies  intended to protect consum-
ers or other groups.  Because of inability to obtain capital and high
personal  discount rates in the private trade,  external  public action
is necessary  to assume  risks  and hold adequate  stocks.
Farmers are  opposed to government  holding of commodity  re-
serves  because  they justifiably  associate  government  stocks  with
low farm prices.  Senator Henry  Bellmon  is preparing  legislation  to
overcome  the  dilemma  by  providing government  inducements  for
farmers  to store commodities.  While the government can use sub-
sidies  to  induce  farmers to  time  the  selling of commodities  in  line
with the public interest,  it is  not entirely clear that price variability
would  be reduced  appreciably  over that of the free  market  under
programs  now  being considered.
Our research  indicates  that  guidelines  such as  acquisition  and
release  of  stocks  when  prices  reach  respective  low  and  high
thresholds generate  social benefits from price  stabilization  that are
nearly  as favorable  as  an optimal  rule  devised  by a  mathematical
formula.  Thus,  a  fairly  operational  rule  is  for the  government  to
purchase  stocks when prices fall 25 percent below equilibrium  and
sell  stocks when  prices  rise 50  percent  above  equilibrium.
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(nearly 60 million  tons of all grains)  appears  not only to be consis-
tent with the U.S.  market but also with world contingency  reserve
needs.  Rather  than  have  a  special  grain  reserve  (the  frequently
suggested level is  12 million tons, but more recent pronouncements
go  up  to  60  million  tons)  solely  for  world  emergency  needs,  it
would  appear  much  less  expensive  to  allow countries  with acute
food  shortages  to  receive  development  dollar  credits  for  use  in
purchasing  food  wherever  available  at  least  cost.  Commodity
stocks  are most efficiently  stored  in countries  where  they are  pro-
duced rather than in  potential food-shortage  areas,  but this idea  is
difficult  to  "sell"  to  potential  food-shortage  countries.  I am  pes-
simistic  about the  ability of nations  to  agree  on a  sensible  world
food reserve policy and feel that humanitarian concerns  require the
United  States  to  establish  on  its own  a  reserve  policy capable  of
responding  to emergency  world  food  needs.
SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS
Consumers'  influence  in  farm policy is accelerating,  and  in the
past few months has been conspicuous in export controls, failure  to
raise  loan  rates,  and  refusal  by  a  labor  union  to  load  wheat  for
shipment  to the Soviet Union.  In previous decades, farmers  often
cooperated  with  consumers  in  passing  legislation  to  insure better
quality  food  as well as to  assure  supplies.  Increasingly,  however,
nonfarm  interests  are  unilaterally  influencing  farm  policy  in  ways
that farmers  consider a threat.
I envisage  two scenarios for future food and farm policy formu-
lation.  One is  confrontation  and conflict,  the other  is cooperation
and conciliation.  The latter, in contrast to past policy formulation,
would  integrate  consumers  and  other  nonfarm  groups  into  the
policy-making  process,  including  assembling  and  analyzing  infor-
mation,  debate,  and  voting  on  the  alternatives.  With  consumers'
programs  representing  three-fourths  of the  U.S.  Department  of
Agriculture  budget, consumers  may be given some additional  rep-
resentation  in the agency.  State agricultural experiment station and
extension  advisory  committees  may  also  include  more  persons
with consumers'  viewpoints.  Representatives  of consumer groups
might  be  encouraged  to  meet  and  interact  with  farm  groups  in
public  policy  education  programs.  Similarly,  representatives  of
farmers'  interests  might  meet  and  interact  with  consumer,  labor,
environmental,  and other groups to  air positions of agreement and
disagreement.
The second scenario,  confrontation  and conflict,  promises con-
110tinued  adversary  posturing  by  farm  and  consumer  groups.  The
scenario  is  characterized  by  hyperbole,  boycotts,  strikes,  and
other  capricious  action  by  groups  not communicating  with  each
other.  Farmers,  long acquiescent  in the face  of what they consider
to be  unwarranted  infringement  into  their legitimate  decision  pro-
cesses,  would  strive mightily and,  at length,  successfully  to  coun-
tervail nonfarm  interference  with collective  bargaining.  Such  con-
frontation  can bring  huge  social costs  and  unrest in society.
The mechanics  of controls  seem less an issue now than what is
the  appropriate  policy to obtain  price  and supply  stability.
Several  improvements  can be  made  in  farm  legislation  consis-
tent with the  public interest:
1.  Raise loan rates to cover nonland operating costs of produc-
tion.
2.  Establish  a sound  commodity  reserve  policy.  Failure  to  do
so  sets  the  stage  for future  export  and  price  controls,  food  price
gyrations  at  home,  famine  abroad,  and,  in general,  outcomes  that
cause confrontations  between interests of farmers  and consumers.
3.  Reduce  import and export controls that inhibit movement of
farm commodities  in  international  markets.
4.  Carefully  review existing  and proposed  occupational  safety
and  environmental  protection  programs,  eliminating  or  revising
programs  for which costs exceed  benefits.
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